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MODEST PROPOSAL*
BRODY**

INTRODUCTION

The National Football League's ("NFL" or "League") First Refusal/Compensation system governing team rights to the services of experienced players is under legal attack by the players.' The players are
attacking the system because it seriously inhibits the ability of players to
put their services up for competitive bidding among the teams and
thereby prevents players from being paid what they are worth. 2 They
are attacking the system in court because they were unable to eliminate
3
it through collective bargaining.
The First Refusal/Compensation system permits teams to retain the
services of veteran free agent players, a player who has completed the
term of his contract, by matching any offer the player may receive from
any other team in the league. On the other hand, if a team chooses not
to meet a competing offer for one of its free agent players, it will receive
compensation from the team signing that player. The compensation will
be draft choices in the league's annual allocation of the services of college trained players seeking entry to the league. 4 There can be no
doubt that this system combining the right of first refusal and compensation has been effective to prevent players from changing teams and also
effective to keep salaries depressed by discouraging competitive bidding
5
for player services within the league.
*
The following proposal is the view solely of the author and not that of the
National Football League or the National League Football Players Association.
**
Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Law. B.S.C. 1959, J.D. 1961,
DePaul University; LL.M. 1978, Northwestern University. Chairman, 1986-87, Association
of American Law Schools, Section on Sports Law.
1. Powell v. NFL, 678 F. Supp. 777 (D. Minn. 1988), rev'd, 888 F.2d 559 (8th Cir.
1989).
2. NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE PLAYERS ASSOCIATION, GAME PLAN '87, A COMMITMENT To NFL PLAYERS PAST, PRESENT, FUTURE 9 (1987) [hereinafter GAME PLAN].
3. Powell, 678 F. Supp. at 781 n.9, ("[t]he Court begins its analysis with the sense that
plaintiffs (the players) are seeking to gain through the courts what they could not win at
the bargaining table.").
4. See generally Powell v. NFL, 888 F.2d 559 (8th Cir. 1989).
5. In Powell, the Court points out:
Notwithstanding the significant liberalization of the traditional free agency
system, during the five-year period covered by the 1977 Collective Bargaining
Agreement, fewer than 50 out of 600 players received offers from other NFL
clubs after becoming free agents. Plaintiffs allege that the only time players
moved was when, in effect, a trade was arranged between two NFL clubs. That
practice occurred on fewer than 20 occasions and only one player actually moved
from one NFL club to another in a transaction in which draft choice compensation was payable.
Powell, 678 F. Supp. at 780 (emphasis added).
The Powell court also points out that the compensation requirements were again liberalized by the 1982 Collective Bargaining Agreement in which the salary levels at which
draft choice compensation would be triggered were raised. However, the court goes on to
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THE CURRENT SITUATION

Presently the parties are operating without a collective bargaining
agreement. The 1982 Agreement terminated in 1987 and the negotiations between the players and the league have not been fruitful. There
was a twenty-four day strike during the 1987 season, but the players returned to work without a new contract. The sticking point in negotiations is clearly free agency. The players demand it while the owners,
recognizing they have a good thing going, are adamant about retaining
First Refusal/Compensation Rights. 6 The litigation is an attempt by the
players to establish free agency by denying to the owners the benefits of
the labor exemption to the antitrust laws for the First Refusal/Compensation system. 7 However, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has decided that although the parties may have reached an impasse in
negotiations and certainly are at impasse as to free agency, it would not
end the labor exemption for the First Refusal/Compensation system.8
Thus, for the time being, the situation remains fixed in concrete.
The players remain committed to unrestricted free agency because
they want freedom of choice. 9 That freedom will allow each player to
pursue his career with teams, coaching staffs and playing systems of his
choosing. It will also allow each player to choose where he will live and
maximize his ability to create a better life for himself after football. The
players also want free agency because they know that competitive bidding for their services will get them salaries more reflective of their contribution to the production of income. I0
The irony is that the players once had the free agency they now seek
and bargained it away. I I Having bargained it away, they cloaked the
First Refusal/Compensation system with the labor exemption.
The owners remain equally committed to maintaining restrictions
on free agency. All their justifications flow from the unique nature of
sports league competition and the need to maintain a high level of competitiveness within the league in order to sustain spectator interest and
thus revenues.' 2 Without restrictions, teams in the more attractive cities
say, "[t]he modifications incorporated in the Agreement did not increase player movement
in the NFL and, in fact, during the five-year period covered by the Agreement, not a single
veteran player moved from one NFL club to another under the Right of First Refusal/
Compensation system." Id. at 781.
The court also pointed out the chilling effect the system has on bidding when it
stated, "[o]f the 1,415 players who became veteran free agents during the term of the 1982
agreement... apparently only one player even received an offer from another club." Id. n.6
(emphasis added).
6. Powell, 678 F. Supp. at 781.
7. Id.
8.
9.
10.
11.

See generally Powell, 888 F.2d 559 (8th Cir. 1989).
See GAME PLAN, supra note 2.
Id.
Lock, The Scope of the Labor Exemption in ProfessionalSports, 1989 DUKE L.J. 339, 359

(1989).
12. Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977).
It seems incongruous that the owners are able to justify reducing financial competition
among themselves by saying that restraint is necessary to maintain athletic competitiveness
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within the league would have an overwhelming advantage in the competition for players and would eventually dominate the on-field competition, thereby destroying the essential appeal of league competition.
Other reasons for restricting player movement to other teams flow
more directly from the commercial nature of professional leagues.
There is a need to maintain the integrity of the game by convincing followers that the players are loyal to the team.' 5 One of the ways professional teams create interest and thereby sell tickets is to get fans to
identify with certain popular players and through them, with the team.
Without a means of controlling player movement, a team's substantial
investment in the marketing of a particular pliyer would be destroyed.
Additionally, if there were not some assurance that the athletic talent
within the league would be equitably distributed among the teams,
fewer cities would be able to support teams. 14 Fewer cities translates
into lost income from franchise fees and television revenues. However,
the major reason owners do not want free agency is that it would increase player salaries. 15 So the owners, wealthy business men, competing among themselves with lucrative, valuable toys, are determined to
keep the First Refusal/Compensation system because they view it as an
integral element in maintaining and enhancing the value of their
franchises.
III.

REALITY

It seems apparent that free agency will have to be bargained. The
trial court, in Powell v. National Football League, after finding that the parties were at impasse on the free agency issue, but nonetheless finding
that the labor exemption survived the expiration of the 1982 Collective
Bargaining Agreement, said:
The Norris-LaGuardia Act and substantive national labor laws
establish that federal labor policy favors resolution of labor disputes through collective bargaining accompanied, if necessary,
by economic sanctions. If the Court intervened at this time with
preliminary injunctive relief, it would reverse the bargaining
leverage of the parties and completely disrupt the bargaining
process. The strong public interest in protecting and promoting the bargaining process merits considerable weight in the
Court's analysis. 16
The appellate court expressed the same commitment to bargaining in its
decision, when it said:
among their teams. It becomes doubly incongruous when one realizes that the reduction
in financial competition is achieved, not by restricting the owners, but by limiting the

players.
13. Canes, The Social Benefits of Restrictions on Team Quality, GOVERNMENT AND THE
SPORTS BusINESs 82 n.2 (R. Noll ed. 1974).

14. Id.
15. "Defendants (owners) contend that the players' insistence upon obtaining free
agency is, in fact, little more than an attempt to increase player salaries by inducing bidding among the NFL clubs." Powell, 678 F. Supp. at 781 n.7.
16. Powell, 690 F. Supp. at 818.
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The labor arena is one with well established rules which are
intended to foster negotiated settlements rather than intervention by the courts. The League and the Players have accepted
this "level playing field" as the basis for their often tempestuous relationship, and we believe that there is substantial justification for requiring the parties to continue to fight on it, so that
bargaining and the exertion of economic
force may be used to
17
bring about legitimate compromise.
The difficulty with bargaining on this issue, at least from the play8
ers' perspective, is that the players have a relatively weak position.'
This results from many 'factors. The disparity of skills of the players,
superstar to marginal, and the resulting undermining of union solidarity, the teams' discretion to determine who shall be on the team and the
resulting lack of job security for most players, coupled with the short
average career of four years, seriously undermine the commitment individuals can make to union objectives. The fact that the players conducted an unsuccessful strike during the 1987 season, combined with
the above disadvantages, put the players in a difficult position to bargain
effectively. 19 The owners, on the other hand, have a very strong bargaining position enhanced by revenue sharing. 20 Such is the disparity
that Professor Lock suggests that the goal of the labor exemption to the
antitrust laws, reconciling the competing antitrust and labor policies,
may not be met through bargaining because whatever compromise
emerges will not be the product of good faith, arm's-length
2
negotiations. '
To correct the situation and establish the proper scope of the labor
exemption in professional sports generally and professional football in
particular, Professor Lock suggests a combination of legislative and judicial action. 22 He suggests that Congress amend the National Labor Relations Act to accommodate the unique nature of professional sports
and that Congress either convince the NFL to establish economic incentives for teams to win so they will compete for players or repeal the
league's present statutory antitrust exemptions. On the judicial side,
Professor Lock recommends that the Minnesota district court hearing
Powell should outline what limitations on free agency it finds acceptable.
Without question these steps would work to resolve the current deadlock, but can these changes be made in the near future?
The Minnesota court could, if it so chose, respond in relatively
quick fashion. But given the commitment to resolving the dispute
through bargaining set forth earlier, can such action reasonably be expected? Further, the legislative process, required to address the questions at the basic level Professor Lock suggests, would be prolonged.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Powell, 888 F.2d at 567.
Lock, supra, note 11, at 354.
Id.
Id. at 357-58.
Id. at 397-98.
Id. at 414.
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Moreover, there is question whether the players, for exactly the same
reasons, would be any more effective in lobbying, than they are in bargaining. Furthermore, because of the high turnover in the player ranks,
extending the time it takes to resolve the problem means that fewer current players share whatever benefits would result.
On the other hand, the owners also have an interest in resolving the
question expeditiously. Obviously, if their bargaining position is what it
23
is believed to be, they will get as favorable terms as they can expect.
More importantly, the league is at the threshold of another period of
growth. Cities clamor for teams and television's appetite for NFL football seems almost insatiable. Opportunities in cable television and "pay
per view" beckon. And on top of all this, there is growing international
interest in the game. The key to maximizing this potential is the stability
only a collective bargaining agreement will bring. The owners want and
need the dispute to be resolved.
The answer is of course good faith, arm's-length negotiation recognizing the legitimate interests on each side. Obviously, neither unrestricted free agency, as the players demand, nor the current First
Refusal/Compensation system is acceptable. Somewhere between these
extremes must lie a point where the owners can have the continuity and
competitiveness that makes for a viable professional league, and the
players can have the freedom they need to control their careers and lives
and be more justly compensated. It is in the interest of both sides to
find a compromise. What follows is an attempt to establish that point by
outlining a free agency system that addresses the legitimate interests of
the players and the teams.
IV.

A

PROPOSAL

The major components of a free agency system must be: (1) determining which players shall be eligible; (2) deciding whether the team
losing a player shall have the right of first refusal; and (3) establishing
the compensation, if any, the signing team must give the team losing the
player,
A.

Eligibility

Veteran players whose contracts have expired and who have been in
the league for four years should be eligible to make their services avail23. What the players have to consider is whether, without judicial intervention, their
bargaining position will improve or further deteriorate with the passing of time. The players are so determined to deny the owners the benefits of the labor exemption for the First
Refusal/Compensation system that they have filed to decertify their current association as
their bargaining representative. Starting Move to Decertify Leaves NFL Union in 'Uncharted
Area', Wash. Post, Nov. 9, 1989, at Ci0, col. 1. Even if decertification is successful, the
issue of free agency will eventually be bargained with the current association's successor.
It seems the best that can occur will be that some current players will gain the benefits of
unrestricted free agency unless the owners decided to face antitrust liability for whatever
restrictions they may unilaterally place on player movement in the hope that those restrictions will be upheld under antitrust law's rule of reason.
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able to all teams in the league. Four years seems appropriate because
that is the "average" career length and thus, making this the eligibility
point would mean that all players who were above the norm would be
able to have the benefits of free agency. An effort should be made to set
the time limit for eligibility so that at least fifty percent of the players
become eligible. Certainly, given the short working careers of professional football players, setting a longer term would render the right
without meaning.
Four years is also fair to the teams. It seems long enough to permit
the team to recoup its "investment" in the player. Teams coach players
in conditioning, skills, techniques and the team's own system of play.
Four years would be time enough for the player to learn and put that
learning to use for the team. Further, within four years a team can and
should determine, with some precision, the value of a particular player
to the team. This determination will enable the team, should it so decide, to attempt to sign the player to contracts covering seasons beyond
the fourth. In other words, teams could attempt to get players to bargain away their forthcoming free agency in exchange for, one would assume, a higher salary than might otherwise be offered, some sort of
guaranteed contract or other benefit. Regardless of the form of the benefit given in exchange for foregoing free agency, the availability of this
opportunity can only result in the player being compensated more proportionately with his contribution to productivity.
B.

First Refusal

The right of a team to match any offer made by another team, and
thereby retain the rights to a free agent attempting to leave its team,
should be eliminated because it has too chilling an effect on the exercise
of free agency. 2 4 It has such an effect because teams are not willing to
bargain with a free agent knowing that if they offer him anywhere near
his true worth, his current team will retain his services simply by meeting
the offer. If free agency is to be in any way effective to meet the legitimate interests of the players, there cannot be any right of first refusal.
However, the "losing" team should be allowed to enter the bidding
for a player attempting to exercise his free agency right by negotiating
with another team. This would require teams to accurately assess a
player's value to them, their resulting interest in him and place a dollar
value on that interest. One would think that their offer would reflect his
value to the team as a player, his value in maintaining fan loyalty to the
team and the value to the league generally in keeping the player on his
present team in order to maintain competitiveness throughout the
league. This, however, may be exactly what the owners are trying to
avoid.
Another benefit of denying teams an absolute right of first refusal
but permitting them to enter the bidding for one of their players exer24. Powell, 678 F. Supp. at 777.

1990]

NFL FREE AGENCY PROPOSAL

cising his right to negotiate with other teams, is that it provides an incentive to teams to treat players well while they are under contract to the
team. This goes beyond paying the player appropriately to include
helping him adjust to the city in which he is contractually bound to play
and live, helping build a future in that city and giving him the belief that
he has the opportunity to play with a winning team.
C.

Compensation

The compensation for signing an eligible veteran free agent should
be a draft choice equal to the draft choice used to acquire the player.
For example, if a team signs a player who was a first round draft choice,
then it owes the losing team a first round draft choice. Or if a team signs
a player who was acquired in a trade for a second round draft choice,
then it owes the losing team a second round draft choice. Draft choices
are a medium of exchange professional football understands and with
which it is comfortable.
The major benefit of this system, as distinct from the current one, is
that the player does not become less attractive as a free agent because
his salary is high. Compensation being set by acquisition cost, rather
than salary, allows a player's salary to reflect his productive value to his
team without it having a chilling effect on his free market value should
his present team undervalue his services. Although the current compensation system gives teams an incentive to pay slightly higher salaries in
order to drive up potential free agency compensation they may receive,
the chilling effect of high free agency compensation has kept player
movement at a minimum and thus kept overall salaries at a lower level.
Removing salary as a criterion in setting free agency compensation
levels will result in each player being paid more in relation to his productive value both by the team currently employing him and by those
teams that may covet his services.
Another benefit of this "same round" draft choice compensation is
that it works to the advantage of lower draft choices who perform better
than anticipated. For example, suppose a player is drafted in the tenth
round but becomes a first team starter and a league all-star. Under current practices such a player is "slotted" for salary purposes, meaning he
has great difficulty getting his salary to a level equal to comparable players who entered the league as highly coveted draft choices. Under the
system proposed, there would be incentive for teams that have such
players to pay them appropriately in order to keep them from seeking
their true value from another team. Undrafted players who become
superstars or even journeymen would also have their salaries quickly
raised to reflect their true worth to the teams employing them.
Thus "same round" draft choice compensation would help create a
free agency system that not only would benefit first round draft choice
superstars, it would benefit players throughout the ranks. It would result in more just compensation for all, and would reduce the impact of
the disparity of skills among the players which weakens the National
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Football League Players Association ("Players Association" or "Association") as a bargaining representative. At the same time, "same round"
compensation free agency requires a number of limitations that serve
the owners' legitimate interest in maintaining competitive balance
throughout the league.
First, in order for a team to sign a veteran free agent it would have
to have an appropriate choice available in order to make compensation.
This has a number of effects. It prevents one team from attempting to
sign all the available superstars; typically, no team would have enough
choices in the high rounds to enter the bidding for more than a few of
available players. Thus it prevents a team from becoming a free agent
predator. It also prevents teams, in what are believed to be the more
attractive cities, from dominating the league because they would not
have enough draft choices to meet the compensation requirements for
all the players that might be attracted to them. The net result is that the
chaos the owners fear would be avoided. Rather, there would be a sufficient number of bidders, especially for the under-valued players, to insure a competitive market so that players would be more justly
compensated.
Second, if the signing team's draft choice in the forthcoming draft is
lower in the round than the choice used by the losing team to acquire
the free agent being signed, the signing team should be required to also
give its draft choice in the next round. The reason for this limitation is
so that successful teams will not have an incentive to, in effect, "trade
up" in the draft by signing a veteran free agent from a weaker team that
used a higher draft choice with which to acquire that player. For example, suppose the current year's Super Bowl champion with the last
choice in each round of the draft, sought to sign a veteran free agent
who was selected with the very first choice in the first round of the draft.
It would be more tempting for the champion to sign established players,
known performers, if all it was required to give as compensation was a
relatively lesser chance to draft a younger player with potential. This
limitation reinforces the underlying theory of the draft by giving the less
successful teams with higher draft choices an advantage in the bidding
for veteran free agents. It also serves to maintain competitive balance
because it makes the compensation price higher for traditionally successful teams. Yet it does not diminish the number of bidders; it merely
shifts bidding power among the bidders in a fashion the league has
favored.
One additional benefit to competitiveness results from "same
round" compensation free agency. The less successful teams with high
draft choices will be encouraged to retain those draft choices rather than
trade them. These choices would become more valuable because they
would represent two ways of improving a team rather than one. They
could be used in the customary way to select entering players or they
could be used to sign established veteran free agents. Increasing the
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value of the higher draft choices held by the less successful teams also
reinforces the underlying theory of the draft.
"Same round" compensation free agency requires one more limitation that prevents chaos but does not diminish competitive bidding for
player services. The period during which negotiations with, and signings of, veteran free agents could occur would have to be restricted to a
time between the end of the season and the next draft. It is convenient
to set this time as beginning after the Super Bowl and ending a week
before the draft. That allows enough time for active bidding and negotiation and also permits time to plan for the changes in teams' drafting
plans that will occur.
A modification in "same round" compensation is needed for veteran free agents in the latter stages of their careers. "Same round"
compensation would have too chilling an effect on the ability of high
draft choices who are in their eighth or ninth season of play to provide
the freedom of choice such players deserve. The physical toll of professional football is so great that it is only in the rarest of circumstances
that a team would surrender a high draft choice to sign a player who had
been playing eight years, regardless of that player's ability. But players
who have been in the league that long and who are capable of contributing to a team so that they may become a coveted free agent, have earned
greater freedom rather than less. Thus, the draft choice compensation
owed by the signing team to the losing team should be adjusted downward. The adjustment could be on a sliding scale geared to the number
of years the player has been in the league, that is the draft choice compensation could be one round lower than that in which the player was
selected for each year beyond six the player has played in the league.
Alternatively, the compensation could be set at a "flat rate," that is, an
eighth round choice for a player signed after his eighth year. However
this modification is made, the point is that it should be made so that
whatever free agency system emerges from negotiation, it meets the interests of these players who have made an extraordinary contribution to
the league.
There is one additional area of compensation that ought to be considered. That deals with extraordinary medical costs. Suppose a player
is severely injured and the team pays all the medical costs to repair the
injury and also pays the player's salary, as it should, while the player
recovers. Suppose the player returns to competition the following year,
plays well and becomes eligible for free agency. Should a team that
signs such a player be required to somehow share those costs, including
the salary that was paid while the player recovered, but did not play? In
Mackey v. National Football League, 25 the court held the teams were not
entitled to compensation for their investment in player development
costs because those expenses were similar to those incurred by other
businesses. 2 6 However, the extraordinary medical costs that often occur
25. Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976).
26. [he reasoning seems akin to the reasoning that essential reliance, as distinct from
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in professional football go beyond and are not similar to those incurred
in other businesses, and some thought should be given to them. While
on the one hand, it is not in the players' interest to raise the required
free agency compensation, it certainly is not in the players' interest to
discourage teams from providing the best medical care and rehabilitation available.
V.

CONCLUSION

It would be beneficial to both the players and the league to resolve
the current dispute over free agency. The quickest way to resolve it is
through bargaining. However, the only bargaining that has any chance
of succeeding is bargaining that recognizes the legitimate interests of
each side.

incidental reliance, is not recoverable in contracts. See Fuller and Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 46 YALE L.J. 52 (1936).

